Abstract. Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) are used in satellite networks for better performance of the TCP/IP applications. Multi-layer IPSec (MLIPSec) resolves the conflict between end-to-end security in standard IPSec and operation of PEPs. Previous Ml-IPSec solution has issues of limited application scope and increased complexity to implement and process the ML-IPSec protected data. This paper presents a new dynamic ML-IPSec protocol which addresses these issues. The paper also analyzes the protocol with reference to previous ML-IPSec protocol and presents the experiment performed to analyze the network performance while running IPSec and ML-IPSec.
Introduction
Multi-Layer IPSec (ML-IPSec) enhances the functionality of IPSec in order to solve the conflicts between IPSec and intermediate entities such as TCP and application layer PEPs. More information on Y. Zhang work on ML-IPSec can be obtained in [1] , [2] . The earlier work on ML-IPSec, done by HRL Laboratories, was presented to IETF in many meetings and an internet-draft was written as well. IETF showed concern in three areas: 1) the idea presented by HRL Laboratories was only targeting very limited domain by fixing the zone map for the security association lifetime, 2) implementation complexity was increased and 3) it was required to show two more actual implementations of ML-IPSec. However, the problem of complexity of key management and security association setup for intermediate devices is also very complex and costly operation in terms of communication and it is not addressed very well. The HRL Laboratories suggested using "Internet Key Exchange (IKE v2)" for key setup. For large networks with large number of intermediate devices, using IKE v2 is not a good option. Also there are requirements for changing the databases of IPSec and IKE to make it compatible with ML-IPSec. The ML-IPSec analysis, design and IETF issues are discussed in detail by M. Bhutta and H.Cruickshank in [3] , [4] . The issues are solved by our proposed novel, new dynamic ML-IPSec protocol. The paper also describes in detail the new proposed Dynamic ML-IPSec design and proof of study performed on SSFNet simulator.
Previous Multilayer IPSec
First let us have an overview of ML-IPSec. The IP datagram is divided into portions. A portion under the same security protection scheme is called "Zone". A zone map is a mapping relationship from octets of the IP datagram to the associated zones for each octet. The zone boundaries must remain fixed within the lifetime of a security association otherwise it will be very difficult to do zone by zone decryption and authentication. Security Association (SA) in IPSec defines the relationship between sender and receiver. The Composite Security Association (CSA) in ML-IPSec also includes the intermediate trusted nodes in addition to the sender and receiver. For each zone, there is an individual security association. Therefore, all security associations for all zones collectively form a CSA to cover the entire IP datagram. A CSA has two elements. The first element is zone map and second element is a zone list. Zone map shows the coverage of each zone in IP datagram and second element, zone list shows the list of SAs for each zone.
As Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) in IPSec provides the maximum security features of IPSec protocol, so here our focus is on ESP only. The discussion on Authentication Header (AH) is out of scope of this paper.
The ESP payload data field in ML-IPSec is divided into multiple pieces depending upon the number of zones. The payload data for each zone collectively along with padding, padding length and next header field is referred to as cipher text block of the zone. In ML-IPSec, different IP datagram parts can be encrypted using different keys for different zones. The ESP authentication data field is also variable in length and contains multiple ICVs which are calculated for different zones and the size of them is dependent on the algorithms being used for integrity. More information on previous ML-IPsec can be found in [1], [2] .
Issues in Previous ML-IPSec
As notified by IETF, the application scope and increased implementation complexity are main issues in previous ML-IPSec [5, HRL Laboratory report] . Also, key management for ML-IPSec is a very complex and big concern to make ML-IPSec enable to provide security services. Y. Zhang proposed to use IKEv2 to establish the security associations between intermediate communicating parties but, using IKEv2 will not scale well and complexity will also increase as network will grow. However, the main focus here is to address the limited application scope of the previous MLIPSec protocol. The key management complexity is out of the scope of this paper. The main reason for limited application scope of previous ML-IPSec protocol is the way how zone map is established. As described earlier in section II, zone map defines the coverage of each zone in IP datagram. The zone map is part of composite security association (CSA) and is established between communicating parties when security association (SA) is established. The zone map must remain constant for the duration of established security association (SA) life time. By making zone map
